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BOOK REVIEWS
The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, by Jonathan Kvan-
vig. Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xvi + 216. $60 (Hardback).
DR TIMOTHY CHAPPELL, University of Dundee, UK 
It seems no surprise that most current work in the theory of knowledge is fo-
cused on knowledge. For all that, Jonathan Kvanvig suspects that this focus 
embeds a mistake. In att empting to expose and reverse this mistake, Kvan-
vig’s book aims to do no less than redirect our thinking in epistemology. 
The focus on knowledge would be justifi ed, if knowledge of the concept 
of knowledge were the one thing needful in epistemology, or if it were ob-
vious that knowledge is more valuable than anything else that epistemol-
ogy is concerned with—because, for instance, knowledge had a value that 
transcended the values of its parts in the way that (on Kvanvig’s reading) 
Socrates looks for, and fails to fi nd, in Plato’s Meno. I’ll come back to the 
former condition shortly; Kvanvig’s book begins by arguing at length that 
the latt er one does not apply. The value of knowledge is real and positive, 
but not greater than the sum of the values of its parts, such as justifi cation 
and true belief. Hence (I have my doubts about this “hence,” by the way), 
there is no good reason to take knowledge to be focal to epistemology. It 
might be bett er, Kvanvig concludes, to take some other concept as our 
focus. He ends by arguing that, since understanding has a value that tran-
scends the value of its constituents, therefore the concept of understand-
ing is a good candidate for this focal role. (Again, I have my doubts about 
this “therefore.”)
Up to chapter 8, Kvanvig’s argument characteristically proceeds by ex-
clusion. Thus chapter 1 excludes the possibility that the value of knowl-
edge is extrinsic or instrumental. Chapters 2–4 build a story about how the 
value of knowledge might equal the sum of the values of its components 
true belief (chapter 2) and justifi cation (chapters 3–4). This story, however, 
comes to an end in chapter 5, where Kvanvig argues that the value of 
knowledge can’t be explained in this additive way, for reasons to do with 
the Gett ier problem. Then Kvanvig argues against more direct approaches 
to the thesis that knowledge is valuable, whether of a broadly realist kind 
(chapter 6) or a broadly att itudinalist kind (chapter 7). These exclusions 
in place, Kvanvig takes it that the way is clear for him to argue, more 
positively, that although knowledge is certainly valuable, understanding 
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is more valuable, and looks to be a much more plausible candidate for the 
role of kingpin-concept in epistemology (chapter 8). 
A fi rst thought about this strategy of argument is: Why not cut to the 
chase? Apparently Kvanvig’s main positive agenda is to argue that un-
derstanding, not knowledge, is the focal concept in epistemology: he will 
eventually argue this in a number of ways, including the rather Platonic 
way of showing that understanding of the concept of understanding is 
more essential for epistemology than knowledge of the concept of knowl-
edge.1 But why the “eventually”? If this is Kvanvig’s main concern, why 
does he not address it straight away, instead of leaving it until the last 
chapter of the main argument? We’ve already seen that, among all the 
things that are excluded in chapters 1–7, one thing that is not excluded is 
the thesis that knowledge is valuable; Kvanvig himself accepts that thesis. 
Thus, within the overall plan of the book, what the fi rst seven chapters 
of the book seem to achieve is, in brief, only the conclusion that it is hard 
to say why knowledge is valuable, or independently valuable. Chapter 8 
then goes on to show that it is easier to say why understanding is valuable, 
or independently valuable. Fine. But obviously enough—and of course 
Kvanvig himself sees this point—there is no good inference from “The 
value of X is easier to justify than the value of Y” to “The value of X is 
greater than the value of Y.” If it’s a claim of the latt er sort that Kvanvig 
really wants to establish, with X = understanding and Y = knowledge, then 
it is puzzling that he should spend as much as seven chapters out of nine 
concentrating on claims of the former sort. 
Perhaps the explanation of this puzzle is that Kvanvig’s method is So-
cratic. Socratic inquiries like the Meno and the Theaetetus too are, aft er all, 
typically indirect, and likely to proceed more by reviewing the alterna-
tives and cautiously closing them oﬀ  than by a tour de force of positive 
assertion. It might also be said, no doubt, that there is much preliminary 
work to be done to clear away our prejudices in favor of knowledge, and 
against understanding. And indeed one of the most valuable features of 
Kvanvig’s book—something that I cannot really do justice to here—is his 
very sharp and interesting discussions of the detail of other contemporary 
epistemologists’ work. 
A second puzzle about the overall strategy of the book relates to Kvan-
vig’s discussion and eventual rejection, in chapters 2–5, of what I’ll call 
the additive thesis, the view that the value of knowledge equals the sum 
of the values of its components, true belief and justifi cation. Kvanvig’s 
eventual argument against this thesis is complex and ingenious; it turns 
on the idea that a good account of the value of knowledge is unlikely also 
to be a good account of the nature of knowledge, and vice versa: “As the 
prospects rise for providing a counterexample-free account of the nature 
of knowledge, the prospects sink for providing an account of [the value 
of] knowledge in terms of the value of its constituents”2 (p. 139). But it 
wasn’t at all clear to me why a much simpler argument against the ad-
ditive thesis wouldn’t do the trick. Quite generally, the idea that values 
are neatly additive seems altogether unpromising. No one supposes that 
if you add the value of the taste of garlic to the value of the taste of ice 
cream, this will give you a good way of computing the likely or actual val-
ue of the taste of garlic-fl avor ice-cream. Why then should anyone make 
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the parallel assumption about knowledge, understood as a composite of 
true belief and justifi cation? Anyone who wants to defend the additive 
thesis about knowledge is not arguing in a way which is routinely reliable 
and hence needs no special defence in its application to this case. On the 
contrary, this argument-schema is so routinely unreliable that we stand in 
need of a special reason for thinking that for once, in the case of knowl-
edge and its components, the argument-schema will work. All Kvanvig 
needs to say against the additive thesis, it seems to me, is that the onus 
is on its defenders to fi nd this special reason, and that until they do, we 
should assume that the additive thesis is not true.
Kvanvig’s fi nal chapters (pp. 8–9; chapter 9 is the Conclusion) give his 
main argument that understanding, unlike knowledge, has a value that 
transcends the value of its constituents, and hence (same worries as before 
about this “hence”) is the central concept for epistemology. Developing 
this main argument, he writes: “Understanding . . . is a construction out 
of true belief and subjective justifi cation of a coherentist variety” (p. 205). 
Very well: but how does this analysis of understanding help to show that 
the value of understanding transcends the two values of true belief and of 
subjective justifi cation? 
Oddly, Kvanvig’s next sentences do not answer that question. Instead 
he says this: 
Because both truth and subjective justifi cation are valuable inde-
pendently of each other and because neither value is swamped by 
the value of the other, we have the basis for an explanation of why 
understanding is more valuable than its subparts. To this basis, we 
add the value created by additional justifi ed true beliefs regarding 
the general explanatory relationships (including logical and proba-
bilistic relationships) that coherentists proclaim to be the defi ning 
features of justifi cation. To have mastered such explanatory relation-
ships is valuable because it gets us to the truth, but also because fi nd-
ing such relationships organises our thinking on a subject matt er in a 
way beyond the mere addition of more true beliefs or even justifi ed 
true beliefs. (p. 205)
I fi nd this a puzzling passage. Kvanvig’s main thesis, remember, is that 
the value of understanding transcends the several values of its compo-
nents. But here what Kvanvig tells us is only that truth and subjective 
justifi cation are independently valuable, and that some other things (fur-
ther “justifi ed true beliefs” about “general explanatory relationships”) are 
independently valuable as well. They are, severally, independently valu-
able, because their values are not “swamped” by other values in the oﬃ  ng. 
That is, their values are not swallowed up by the value of something else 
in the way that, to take Kvanvig’s example (pp. 45–47), the value of reliable 
belief is swallowed up by the value of true belief (in the sense that the only 
reason for valuing reliable belief is because it is or tends to be true belief). 
But the question of swamping is surely irrelevant here. That the various 
components of understanding have values independently of each other is 
one claim. That understanding has a value above and beyond the values 
of its components is quite another. To prove the former, therefore, is not 
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to prove the latt er. And to say, as Kvanvig does, that proving the former 
gives us “a basis” for proving the latt er is not to explain what exactly this 
basis is. 
In any case, it comes to look, in this passage and in others, as if there 
is no way of sett ling whether or not understanding has a value that tran-
scends the values of its components. Suppose we defi ne understanding as 
Kvanvig does, as “a body of information [held by a person] together with 
the grasping of explanatory connections concerning that information” (p. 
200). Here it is clear that having a body of information has value, and also 
that grasping explanatory connections about that information has value; 
moreover, as Kvanvig tells us, these two components of understanding 
have independent values. So does understanding have a value that is 
greater than the combined values of these two components? I have no idea 
how to answer that question, and no idea what kind of argument might be 
used to sett le it. Garlic ice-cream is back on the menu here; the problem is, 
as before, that in general value-relations are unpredictably organic rather 
than predictably additive. But even if we were to try and stabilise the de-
bate by assuming additive predictability, it would still be quite unclear 
how the argument for the value of understanding, over and above the 
values of its constituents, would be supposed to go. 
 (And how—we might ask here—would it have gone for Plato? How 
would he have argued the case for thinking that the value of epistêmê tran-
scends the values of true belief and justifi cation? 3 The answer to that, I 
think, lies in the theory of the Forms, which I doubt Kvanvig would wish 
to deploy. We should also note that—at least in the Republic, though per-
haps not in the Meno or the Theaetetus—Plato actually denies that knowl-
edge has true belief and justifi cation as components; I doubt Kvanvig 
would want to follow Plato down this road, either.)
What’s more, any argument aiming at the conclusion that understand-
ing has a value that transcends the values of its components would seem 
to face a serious tactical problem. This is that any factor cited as the key 
“factor X” to give understanding its special added value, over and above 
the values of its components, would itself be ripe for treatment as another 
component of understanding. (We can do this, for example, with “the or-
ganisation of our thinking” in the passage from 205 quoted above.) But if 
factor X too is a component of understanding, then once more the value of 
understanding will not outrun the sums of the values of its components. 
If this line of thought is right, then the value of understanding cannot be 
greater than the sums of the values of its components; and pari passu, the 
value of knowledge cannot be greater than the sums of the values of its 
components, either. But whether the line of thought is right is hard to tell, 
because of the key problem that I have been calling the garlic ice-cream 
problem: the intractability of values when we try to add them together. 
If I am right about any or even some of this, then there are serious 
problems for Kvanvig’s main argument. His main argument is, presum-
ably, what a review of his book ought to focus on; but in a way this is a 
pity, because Kvanvig’s book has many merits that are quite unaﬀ ected 
by problems on the main line. I have already mentioned his excellent 
discussions of much of the recent literature, and should also enter three 
cheers for Kvanvig’s principal conclusions. Even if I have my doubts about 
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Kvanvig’s routes to this destination, I applaud and welcome his two most 
important bott om-line contentions: fi rst that epistemologists should think 
more about the value of knowledge and other epistemic states, and second 
that what normative epistemology should really be aft er is not knowl-
edge, but understanding.
NOTES
1. Thus, in eﬀ ect, Kvanvig: “Att ending to the relationship between knowl-
edge and understanding can give us hope in our pursuit of special and unique 
value for epistemic achievements, even though we have had to give up such 
hope regarding the cognitive achievement of knowledge” (p. 186). Cp. Burn-
yeat, The Theaetetus of Plato: “A bett er understanding of knowledge is the pre-
condition for solving the problem of false judgement (p. 200c–d).” 
2. This is my gloss, prompted by comparison with other contexts, where 
Kvanvig very frequently contrasts accounts of the nature with accounts of the 
value of knowledge. If there is a misprint here, it is not, unfortunately, the only 
one. (p. 13 “Daedelus” for “Daedalus”; p. 30 “Buryeat” for “Burnyeat”; on p. 
201 we have “laudatory” where the context demands “laudable,” on p. 108 
the non-word “virtuousity”; on p. 193 it is disappointing to fi nd Cambridge 
University Press, of all people, misspelling the Greek epistêmê.)
3. However we translate epistêmê. Kvanvig rightly points out that “knowl-
edge” may actually be a less accurate translation for what Plato has in mind 
than “understanding” (p. 193). “Science” (in a broad sense, like the German 
Wissenschaft ) might also be more accurate than “knowledge.”
The Cambridge Companion to Anselm, edited by Brian Davies and Brian 
Left ow. Cambridge University Press, 2004. 323 pages. $65.00 cloth/$29.99 
paper. 
SARAH BORDEN, Wheaton College (IL)
The Introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Anselm begins by de-
scribing Anselm of Canterbury as “at once one of the best- and least-
known of medieval thinkers” (p. 1). This volume of the Cambridge Com-
panion series does an excellent job of both oﬀ ering substantive pieces 
on the topics for which Anselm is already so well known (most notably, 
the ontological argument) and introducing readers to those for which 
he is not, but arguably ought to be. As the authors make clear, there is a 
breadth and passion to Anselm’s thought that can oft en be missed when 
simply reading Anselm as a set up for contemporary debate regarding 
God’s existence. 
There are twelve essays in this text, a substantive bibliography, and 
an index. Among the notable strengths of the volume is the spectrum of 
topics covered: biography, philosophy of language, modality, freedom, 
ethical theory, as well as theological topics including the Trinity and the 
atonement. Signifi cant as well is the variety of approaches. Peter King’s es-
say, “Anselm’s philosophy of language,” provides an analysis of Anselm’s 
texts on the topic. King writes, “[Anselm] takes up issues in the philosophy 
